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Intentions and Ambivalences in U.S. Policies towards Europe 
 
Michaela Hönicke 
 
In his conclusion to a study of American postwar visions of Europe as 
entertained by Franklin Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean Acheson, the 
historian John Harper points to a certain ironic relationship between intentions and 
results. In their efforts to help Europe back on its feet, American politicians had 
various scenarios in mind; for example, containing Germany with the help of Russia 
(FDR) or containing the Soviet Union with the help of Germany respectively 
(Kennan). What prevailed in the end was a compromise position associated with 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson that also reflected contemporary European 
preferences: a combination of restoring and controlling Europe. An underlying 
consensus characterized each of these plans and persisted throughout the postwar 
period. The United States wanted to retain some basic control over Europe and its 
policy was marked by a certain hesitancy or ambivalence when it came to the 
question of ‘finality’, as it has recently been called: a unified, emancipated Europe.  
This consensus was expressed again in the mid-70s by Henry Kissinger who 
preferred a nation-based Europe that would allow the United States to maintain its 
influence at many centers of decision rather than having to expend more political 
capital on shaping the views of a single, supranational organization. But, as 
historians know, policymakers do not have complete control over the eventual results 
of their policies. Thus it is clear today that the current development of a unified 
Europe is in part the result of American engagement and investment in, as well as 
protection of Europe. After decades of concentrating on their economic and political 
integration, Europeans are now ready to undertake a final push towards a unified 
Europe – including a common foreign and security policy. American policy toward 
Europe contributed to this process, although it is by no means clear that American 
political leaders had necessarily intended this result.  
Furthermore, hesitancy vis-à-vis the idea of a united, strong Europe was – 
again in historic perspective - not the exclusive domain of the Americans. American 
ambivalence - urging European unity while balking at its final consequences - is no 
 2 
different from – and has indeed faithfully reflected over time – the attitudes of many 
Europeans themselves. 
Some of the problems that currently trouble the transatlantic relationship, of 
course, also have long precedents in the history of U.S. relations with Europe. 
Secretary of Acheson told the appointed SACEUR, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, that the 
U.S. Congress would not support massive American engagement in Europe if the 
perception persisted that the Europeans did not shoulder their fair share. Europeans 
understood this well and partly in response to such concerns embarked on the 
project of a European Defense Community (EDC). John Hulsman of the Heritage 
Foundation traces the considerable distance that European political integration has 
come since the eventual failure of the EDC – and by implication emphasizes the 
positive historical context and consequences of the new European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) which he encourages American political leaders to welcome 
as a necessary step towards meeting their long-standing demands. 
We are today at a historic, new moment where ambivalences on both sides 
could dissolve. Americans are renewing their calls – this time with greater urgency -  
for a more significant European share of the "burden" and Europeans for the first time 
in their history appear ready – out of their very own interests – to make a substantive 
response to this call: to engage in a concerted effort both on a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and more specifically on a European Security and Defense 
Policy. On the surface it might appear that both sides – for their own distinctive 
reasons – would want the same thing: greater European responsibility and self-
reliance in defense and security matters. And while some American commentators – 
moreover from different political camps such as Charles Kupchan (Council on 
Foreign Relations and a member of Gore's foreign policy adviser team) and John 
Hulsman – concur with this assessment, the recent talk about a "continental drift" and 
a "widening of the Atlantic" suggests otherwise. Matters are apparently again more 
complicated. What we are currently witnessing is a fundamental re-negotiation of the 
transatlantic relationship, which is unfortunately accompanied by sharp rhetoric and 
cherished misperceptions on both sides.  
The backdrop against which this re-balancing act takes place is a new spirit of 
self-confidence and self-assertion in Europe and a mixture of self-contentedness and 
unilateral self-reliance in the United States. Senator Joseph Biden warned of a 
dangerous version of this alignment, calling it the "unholy symbiosis" between anti-
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Americanism and American isolationism. Peter Rodman of the Nixon Center more 
sanguinely maintains that dependence breeds resentment and that the United States 
should welcome European efforts to strengthen its own defense capabilities. For this 
conservative foreign policy expert, as for his younger colleague Hulsman, who both 
reject liberal internationalist Wilsonianism, the renewed European endeavor to 
become more self-reliant is an appreciated counterpart to their own vision of a more 
restrained, geopolitical-minded, national-interest based American international 
engagement. On the other hand, and again from two different political camps, 
Charles Kupchan and Jeff Gedmin of the American Enterprise Institute remind the 
Europeans that skeptical questions and concerns regarding ESDP are being 
expressed by committed American Atlanticists, not isolationists or unilateral 
hegemonists.  
In October of last year, at the height of the election campaign, one of George 
W. Bush's closest, and during that time most vocal foreign policy advisers, 
Condoleezza Rice – now National Security Adviser - caused an uproar among the 
European Allies by announcing in an interview with the New York Times Bush's plans 
to withdraw U.S. troops from the Balkans as part of a more equitable burden-sharing 
within the alliance. American military might was to be reserved for more demanding 
tasks than peacekeeping. Rice suggested that the 82nd Airborne should not have to 
escort kids to kindergarten. (Gordon 2000). The view of U.S. military personnel on 
the scene is quite different, incidentally: peacekeeping in the Balkans seems a valid 
and rewarding enterprise to the troops involved in this effort. (Gordon/Erlanger 2001).  
With respect to the European outcry it has to be emphasized that there had 
been earlier warnings that American political sentiment was turning in this direction. 
In May and September of that year members of the Senate and of the House of 
Representatives attempted to add their initiatives to existing legislation obliging 
President Clinton to withdraw U.S. troops, if the Europeans did not increase their 
commitment. On the other hand, there is no American consensus on this issue. As 
the retired SACEUR Wesley Clark pointed out at the time, in view of the fact that the 
European allies were putting in more than 80 percent of the effort, there was not 
much room for an argument about burden-sharing. If the United States wanted to be 
part of this, which could be translated as 'have a say in this', they could not afford to 
do much less. 
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But it is also worth pondering the motives for the European clamor over this 
announcement. Rice's differentiation in that interview between the U.S. military power 
that had to be saved for situations like "a showdown in the gulf," "to protect Saudi 
Arabia and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Straits" and the Europeans' responsibility for 
"extended peacekeeping" missions (and one might add "nation building") in the 
Balkans reflected a division of labor that seemed to take into account preferences on 
both sides. Robert Blackwill for example lists as European responses – that obviously 
frustrate him - to American demands for more European defense initiative: "We (the 
Europeans) prefer to concentrate on our historic task of stabilizing Europe at least for 
the next decade." "We don't do combat anymore; that's the U.S. specialty." "We 
cannot afford the resources required to create the sort of power projection 
capabilities that would allow us to join the United States in a major way in Gulf 
contingencies." (Blackwill 2000: 69). Thus one might think that Rice's proposal was 
exactly the kind of division of labor that both sides were looking for. Instead it proved 
very upsetting, remains an issue to this day – Senator Biden insisted upon the need 
to reassure the allies again in Colin Powell's confirmation hearings as Secretary of 
State – and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic made clear that this distribution of 
responsibilities would render NATO obsolete and undermine the alliance.  
There are, however, conflicting views within the German Atlanticist community, 
a split between security and defense experts who adhere to the above credo and 
others who entertain visions more along the lines of the political scientist Ernst-Otto 
Czempiel. Conceptually Czempiel finds the transatlantic community at a crossroad 
and would prefer to see the Europeans not follow the U.S. lead of stocking up 
militarily, but rather to assert themselves in the field of conflict prevention through 
political means as well as financial measures. This, he argues, would also contribute 
to an urgently needed civilizing of the West's modern foreign policy – thus criticizing 
the heavy reliance of the use of military force in dealing among others with 
humanitarian catastrophes at a point when it is too late for other measures. 
(Czempiel 2000). 
The whole transatlantic debate on ESDP has shown signs of renewed 
ambivalence – on both sides. European fears of being assigned the role of foot 
soldiers in the alliance find their mirror image in American fears of the de-coupling 
consequences of ESDP. American politicians managed simultaneously to call for a 
greater European share in their own security and then to fear political decoupling and 
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a weakening of the alliance from the moment the European Security and Defense 
Initiative (ESDI) first appeared on the horizon. In a review of successive U.S. 
reactions to European defense plans former senior specialist for the Congressional 
Research Service Stanley Sloan emphasizes the conflicted nature of the responses 
that ranged from “don’t gang up on us” to “yes, but...” (Sloan 2000). The position of 
the new Bush administration can best be summarized as "yes, if…" U.S. 
Representative to the EU, Richard Morningstar, unequivocally explained that his 
government supports ESDP "as long as it is developed in a way that strengthens 
NATO" (January 23, 2001). Similarly, Powell insisted during his recent testimony 
before the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee that NATO had absolute primacy 
(was in fact "sacrosanct") in U.S. relations with Europe – an idea repeated more 
recently in Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s speech at the Munich 
Conference on Security Policy. To portray the current administration’s approach as 
more critical towards ESDP than its predecessor is to ignore Madeleine Albright’s 
insistence on the three “D”s as well as to forget William Cohen’s admonitions on the 
same topic. (Fitchett) 
From an American perspective it seems that the EU can hardly be on the right 
track when its largest member state spends only 1.3 % of its GDP on defense. 
Similarly the fear that Europe keeps building new institutions when it should be 
building capabilities runs like a leitmotif through American statements on ESDP (most 
recently: Senator John McCain at Munich Conference). American reactions - in 
addition to fears of political decoupling due to a European desire for autonomy - are 
further complicated by the rather opposite fear of strategic decoupling as a result of 
technological obsolescence and insufficient military spending in Europe. (Gnesotto 
2000). Concern over strategic decoupling reflects three factors: first, on the European 
side there had for some time been more talk about ESDP than action, secondly, to 
the gap between European and U.S. military capabilities that became painfully 
apparent in the Kosovo war and thirdly, to American worries about equitable burden-
sharing when European defense budgets decrease while theirs increases. 
As an illustration of this dilemma, the Task Force Report on The Future of 
Transatlantic Relations, chaired by Robert Blackwill, states, on the one hand, as the 
intent of U.S. policy: to draw Europe increasingly farther into a global strategic 
partnership to help shape the international system. (Future 1999, 3). Yet soon the 
first issue of contention is brought forward in this report: "With their almost exclusive 
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emphasis on nonmilitary instruments to deal with virtually every international security 
problem, allied timidity with respect to the use of force will be a persistent problem for 
America and for the transatlantic alliance in the period ahead." (Ibid., 13) The 
Europeans, in fact, concur – recalling Czempiel's preference - albeit from the 
opposite perspective. Nicole Gnesotto moreover deplores the manifest absence of a 
European debate on American strategic developments. While the Europeans are 
going through a phase of intense introspection, they seem to ignore their interest in 
what is after all one of the main deciding factors in their defense policy: American 
strategic developments. American experts' fascination with and faith in the current 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) indeed only heightens the sense of an 
unbridgeable gap between the U.S. and Europe. (Schwarz 1999). In his most recent 
speech on his agenda in the realm of national defense President Bush, too, 
reiterated his commitment to reaping the fruits of RMA. 
A counterpart to American reactions to ESDP can be seen in European 
reactions to American plans for a missile defense system, in its national version 
NMD. The overwhelming response so far has been one of rejection due to two 
concerns. First of all, a national missile defense shield in particular would lead to the 
creation of zones of different security within the alliance, and secondly, Europeans 
worry about the political fallout of such plans for the West's relationship with Russia 
and China, the Bush administration's announcements regarding the obsolescence of 
the ABM Treaty and the risk of a new arms race.  
Yet, differentiations and nuances on both sides of the Atlantic and the issue 
have begun to emerge. For some time now, experts like Joachim Krause and Oliver 
Thränert have stressed that in order to understand the significance of NMD in U.S. 
policy, one must take into consideration the domestic context of the debate. The 
Senate vote of 97 against three, for example, in favor of legislation requiring the 
President to introduce a national missile defense system as soon as it would become 
technologically feasible, reflect the overwhelming domestic political support that this 
project enjoys. Moreover, it is quite clear that Europeans and Americans do not share 
the same threat perception when it comes to the renamed "rogue states." Even as 
they acknowledge that a missile shield will not protect them against all forms of 
terrorist attacks or blackmail, Americans simply refuse to be left at risk when there is 
a solution at hand which is moreover a defensive system, effective – and from their 
perspective presumably affordable - that could protect them against some of these 
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threats. (Thränert 2000). American politicians in turn stress their constitutional 
obligation to make such a protective shield available. 
More recently the chairman of the Geneva Center for Security Policy, Francois 
Heisbourg, too, advised the Europeans not to squander political capital by mounting 
a massive and outright rejection campaign against this American preference, but 
rather to leave the negotiations at first to those countries affected by U.S. plans, 
Britain and Denmark. (Heisbourg 2001). On the other side, there are different 
positions both within the U.S political community and nuances of difference even  
among Bush’s foreign policy and security people themselves. The basic commitment 
to these plans was formed in response to the alarming findings of the Rumsfeld 
commission on the threat of ballistic missiles as submitted in its final report in 1998. 
(Hönicke 2000). Donald H. Rumsfeld is now secretary of defense and a determined 
advocate of NMD; in the testimony of his colleague at Foggy Bottom, however, close 
observers detected some confirmation of Powell's reservations about rapid 
deployment. Finally, defense experts, scientists and other commentators continue to 
speak out publicly against lofty "sci-fi" dreams urging instead to address more 
imminent security problems. (Keeney 1998; Friedman 2001;Lindsay/O'Hanlon 2001; 
Kagan 2001). Thus – and also in view of the technological uncertainties of the 
system tested so far and its alternatives (TMD, boost-phase interceptors) – there still 
is room for consultation, provided Europeans do not continue to dismiss American 
commitment.  
In a chorus of conflicted, ambiguous and wary voices, Charles Kupchan has 
been among those who have unequivocally welcomed, encouraged and indeed 
defended European emancipatory endeavors in the security and defense policy 
realm. His support for European efforts to achieve a common defense and security 
policy is based on an assessment of fundamental changes in American thinking 
about the transatlantic relationship. Accordingly he has consistently warned 
Europeans that America's days as Europe's chief peacemaker, protector and arbiter 
have come to an end: "Mainstream, internationalist, Atlanticist Americans, whether 
from the left or right, whether politician or analyst, are beginning to question the 
viability of the transatlantic security bargain as it has existed over the past five 
decades – namely, that Europe pursues integration while the US keeps the peace." 
(Kupchan 2000:16). 
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A generational change that first became apparent in Congress, will over time 
most likely shape the broader public outlook on international affairs, leading to the 
following paradox: just at the time when the United States' superpower status looks 
unchallenged, a younger generation of Americans rises into positions of influence in 
both the private and public sectors that has not been shaped by the formative 
experience of World War II and the construction of the last post-war order. They will 
be followed by another generation – currently still in school – for whom not even the 
cold war will have been a first-hand experience. While these Americans will not 
necessarily be isolationist, Kupchan contends that they will “be less interested and 
knowledgeable about foreign affairs than their older colleagues” and “in the absence 
of a manifest threat to American national security, making the case for engagement 
and sacrifice abroad thus promises to grow increasingly difficult with time.” (Kupchan 
1999:23). 
While there is some evidence for Kupchan's predictions, they should not be 
taken as confirmation of those concerns, periodically being expressed, that American 
popular interests shift away from Europe. Similarly, there is the argument that 
because of the changing ethnic composition of U.S. society and the growing Hispanic 
population American foreign policy would change. Yet there is no indication that 
developments on that level will have the de-coupling effect Europeans seem to fear. 
Eighty percent of the American population still think of themselves as of European 
descent. Of course, there is the effect of what James Lindsay of the Brookings 
Institution has called the "squeaky wheel" – namely that in the absence of sustained 
and intense interests in foreign policy issues on the part of the broader American 
public, it has been special interest groups that have managed to capture the attention 
of policy makers in Congress (such as the Cuban exile community in the Elián case 
or the anti-abortion activists in the context of UN dues). But although, as Lindsay 
notes in the same context, membership in the Congressional Indian Caucus is nearly 
double that of the Congressional Study Group on Germany – there is little evidence 
that any of this has so far had a noticeable effect on the fundamentally positive 
attitudes towards and reasonably well-informed views on Europe. Numbers on trends 
of Americans studying abroad in Europe, enrollment at graduate level in European 
Studies Centers at American universities around the nation (as well as subsequently 
conferred degrees) are in fact rising in average by 30 % and reflect a strong interest 
in European affairs. (Guérot/Nash 2000).  
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 With respect to American perceptions of the European Union, Stephen Kull’s 
research at the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) suggests that 
American hopes by far outweigh fears about European unification: 82 % of 
Americans polled agreed that if the EU countries act together, “almost like a single 
country, they may be able to share more of the burden in keeping the peace in 
Europe and the world, so this would be good.” When it comes to support for the 
European Joint Force, Americans are split fifty-fifty in their assessment of whether 
this would be a good idea. The exact formulation in the questionnaire is as follows “to 
deal with problems in Europe without having to involve the US”. The numbers 
unmistakably rise again when it comes to support of the European Monetary Union 
and the introduction of the Euro. Here the comparison with European polls is 
interesting: while 39 % of the British surveyed believe that “economic unification of 
Europe is mostly a good thing for their country ”, 50 % of Germans agree with the 
same statement, and 55 % of the French – compared to 60 % of Americans who 
believe that economic unification of Europe is a good thing for their country! Similarly, 
with respect to political European unification, 34 % of the British, 54 % of the French, 
59% of the Germans and 58 % of Americans believe that it is “mostly a good thing.” 
(PIPA 1998). 
With the election of George W. Bush a new conservative foreign policy style 
will also affect the transatlantic relationship. Bush himself termed it in the second 
televised campaign debate “strong and humble.” Flora Lewis critically and aptly 
translated it into “spend, don’t send” and in a more detached manner, one might refer 
to it as a “realist,” pragmatic, moderately internationalist position that emphasizes 
narrowly defined national interests and military strength. Most of the Republican 
foreign policy experts are in this camp which can be delimited against the professed 
Democratic preference for a more “forward engagement” of the world, based on 
liberal, universalist assumptions that motivate intervention in order to promote 
democracy and alleviate massive human suffering. The actual policy of President 
Clinton’s democratic administration which, of course, had to be worked out in 
cooperation (or conflict) with a Republican Congress, lay somewhere in the middle. 
The conservative approach addresses one aspect of the larger public's preferences – 
an international restraint, a greater selectiveness, but it ignores an array of other 
preferences:  there is still a significant altruism, idealism and willingness to help and 
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assist others among Americans: a reservoir into which the Bush administration 
presumably will not tap. (Kull/Destler 1999) 
A sub-theme of American visions of Europe greeted hesitantly on the other 
side of the Atlantic are American expectations of Germany ten years after unification 
and President Bush's (Sr.) offer to be a "partner in leadership." American 
commentators on the occasion of our tenth anniversary seemed disappointed. The 
invitation had not been met with enthusiasm or even a serious discussion in Germany 
about its role in world affairs. Concerned analysts point to the "dangerously" low 
financial commitment with respect to the military dimension of the joined endeavors. 
With 1,5 % of its GDP for defense spending, Germany sets a record low even among 
its European allies. Americans knowledgeable and supportive of Germany's position, 
wanted "their German friends to realize that after 55 years, atonement of World War 
II doesn't mean doing nothing. It means doing the right thing – even when the path 
there is not ablaze with the light of moral certitude." (Benjamin 2000; Livingston 
2000).  
In a recent study of mutual German-American perceptions in the crucial years 
between the fall of the wall and the Gulf war, Wulf Schmiese lists stereotypes for both 
sides that are very familiar to the historian. German clichés about U.S. foreign policy 
revolve around notions of materialism, hypocrisy and imperialism. American images 
of Germany during the same time also have long traditions and focus on political 
unreliability, the fear of a domineering power and unpredictability. Yet the difference 
to their German counterparts is a greater capacity for differentiation. These negative 
views are counterbalanced by positive ones that see in Germany Europe’s “model 
democracy” and that reflect in general significantly more goodwill and support than 
vice versa. Schmiese sensibly discards the term “anti-Americanism” and subsumes 
the German journalistic portrayals instead in the category of a critique of the United 
States based on stereotypes. (Schmiese 2000). 
Finally, there is the ever more frequently cited growing cultural gap between 
America and Europe due to diverging sets of values (death penalty, guns, abortion, 
religious fundamentalism) which presumably is going to widen now with all the 
cowboy hats and boots in Washington. All evidence suggests, however, that there is 
a culture war going on within America and a dramatic cultural differentiation even 
within the two parties, namely between the two coasts and urban centers on the one 
hand and the more rural and small town America on the other hand. This conflict has 
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proportions similar to the profound transformation America witnessed a hundred 
years ago when cultural traditionalism asserted itself in reaction to an industrial 
revolution comparable to the changes in technology we witness today. Thus in the 
end there might be more affinity between urban America and Europe than between 
urban America and rural/small town America. (Applebome 1997). It would primarily 
betray Euro-centrism and provincialism if our image of the United States were 
reduced to parts of Texas. 
Returning to the earlier theme of irony: it should indeed be very alarming to 
any committed European if Kissinger proved right in his prediction of the early 1970s 
that a united Europe would adopt an anti-American mold as the only way to achieve 
a sense of identity. Intuitively as a European one would hold against such an 
argument that it underestimates Europe's own genuine potential, but the recent anti-
American tinge in some of our current European debates on the transatlantic 
problems seem to confirm Kissinger's prediction. (Koch 2000). Europeans should 
recognize that some of their differences with the United States arise out of the fact 
that the latter is a global power and assumes global responsibilities while we still 
have to engage in domestic debates whether we even want to attempt to play in that 
league. As Europe gets ready to assume a more pro-active role in addressing the 
world's problems, high-minded as well as pragmatic reasons suggest that the United 
States might still be the preferred partner in many of those undertakings. On the 
other hand, some members of the American political elite appear to have – primarily 
psychological – difficulties in dealing with the consequences of their energetic and 
successful decade-long engagement in Europe: the Europeans have now reached a 
level of emancipation that allows them to make substantial contributions on their own 
- including in the realm of foreign and security policy - which should not be misread 
as signs of rebellion, but instead should be welcomed as the long called for adequate 
share. There is much need for close and candid consultations and exchanges, not for 
cavalier and acrimonious rhetoric.  
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